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“Il nome della libertà, il quale forza alcuno non doma, tempo alcuno non consuma e merito alcuno
non contrappesa.”
Machiavelli, Istorie Fiorentine, II 34
“It is true that we have to give up hope of ever acceding to a point of view that could give us
access to any complete and definitive knowledge of what may constitute our historical limits. And
from this point of view the theoretical and practical experience that we have of our limits and of
the possibility of moving beyond them is always limited and determined; thus we are always in the
position of beginning again.”
Foucault, What is Enlightenment?
1The disputed nature of  Machiavelli’s legacy
The purpose of this essay is to offer a new description of Mach avelli’s
legacy to the political and philosophical discourse of modernity. I take as my
starting point Strauss’s interpretation of this legacy because he proposes its
strongest version, e which is adopted, in its central points, even by thinkers who
wish to defend, rather than reject, the project of modernity. Put bluntly, Strauss
argues that modern political thought, from Machiavelli and Hobbes, through
Rousseau, Kant and Hegel, culminating in Nietzsche, is thoroughly historicist,1 by
which he means that it cannot “answer the question of right and wrong or of  the
best social order in a universally valid manner, in a manner valid for all historical
epochs, as political philosophy requires.”2
Strauss takes Machiavelli to be responsible for modern historicism on the
basis of the following, central argument:
classical political science took its bearing by man’s perfection or by how men ought to live,
and it culminated in the description of the best political order. Such an order was meant to
be one whose realization was possible without a miraculous or nonmiraculous change in
human nature, but its realization was not considered probable, because it was thought to
depend on chance. Machiavelli attacks this view both by demanding that one should take
one’s bearings, not by how men ought to live but by how they actually live, and by
suggesting that chance could or should be controlled. It is this attack which laid the
foundation for all specifically modern thought. The concern with a guarantee for the
realization of the “ideal” led to both a lowering of the standards of political life and to the
2emergence of  “philosophy of history”: even the modern opponents of Machiavelli could not
restore the sober view of the classics regarding the relation of  “ideal” and “reality.”3
According to this schema, the ancients are “idealist” because they uphold the
absolute, non-mediatable separation or chorismos between fact and norm, real and
ideal, is and ought, while the moderns are “realist” because for them this separation
is relative and allows for mediation. Given the absolute character of the separation
between real and ideal, the ideal can realize itself in the real only “by chance,” in
the sense that there is no “reason” or “ground” that can bridge the chorismos
between the ideality of the good and the facticityof  the real. Conversely, the
relative character of the separation between fact and norm, real and ideal, opens the
way for thinking of a rational process whereby one can be realized or unified in the
other at the cost of  “lowering” the standards of  what counts as virtue. In order for
the ideal to be realized in the real (or conversely, for the real to be raised to the
ideal), one must add the further requirement that human action be capable of
controlling chance through a technical conception of reason, that is, a conception of
reason that allows to “master” the irrationality, the contingency or chance-character
of the real. It is easy to see why Strauss concludes that by setting forward these two
requirements, Machiavelli’s discourse originates modern philosophy of history
(whose central tenet is best captured by Hegel’s dictum that “the rational is the real,
3and the real is the rational”)4, while at the same time it reduces “the political
problem… [to] a technical problem” thanks to its instrumentalization of reason.5
Behind this loss of absolute moral standards and the rise of instrumental
rationality stands modernity’s rejection of  heteronomy: “man calls nature before the
tribunal of his reason... all truth and meaning originate in man; they are not inherent
in a cosmic order which exists independently of man’s activity.”6 In part cular,
modern thought destroys the teleological understanding of nature according to which
“there is a specific perfection which belongs to each specific nature.... [and] nature
supplies the standard, a standard wholly independent of man’s will.”7 Prior to
modernity, according to Strauss, both “Athens” and “Jerusalem” coincided in
proclaiming the teronomous ground of morality, where the secondary place held
by human beings in the order f  things was unquestioned. For the Bible,
righteousness is compliance with the “divinely established order;” for Greek and
Roman thought, justice “is compliance with the natural order.”8 Mode n political
thinking, instead, emerges once both the divine (“Jerusalem”) and the natural
(“Athens”) foundations of order are brought into question.
Strauss’s reconstruction of modernity is not easily brushed away. In its
essentials, it corresponds to Blumenberg’s understanding of modernity in terms of
the “self-assertion” of man, which he takes to mean “an existential program,
according to which man posits his existence in a historical situation and indicates to
4himself how he is going to deal with the reality surrounding him and what use he
will make of the possibilities that are open to him.”9 Strauss’s claim that the
modernity initiated by Machiavelli finds its completion with Nietzsche is echoed by
Blumenberg saying that the modern “existential program” finds its fullest expression
in Nietzsche’s concept of the eternal return, which he interprets as the attempt “to
raise the sum total of consequences of human action to the role of the ineluctible
lawfulness of the world and thus to charge man with absolute responsibility for the
world. Theory, which contemplates the world, was to become functionless
compared with the praxis that changes it.”10 But whereas Blumenberg does not
venture into why the priority of praxis over theory, the effort to change given orders
of things as opposed to the contemplation of  n eternal order, should require the
critique of the moral viewpoint and the radical negation of the difference between
ideality and reality that one finds in Nietzsche, Strauss instead sees a direct
connection between human self-assertion and the progress of nihilism and relativism
in modernity.
If, as Strauss argues, human autonomy or self-assertion (for the moment I do
not distinguish these variations on the fundamental priority of praxis over theory) is
bought at the price of denying the absolute transcendence of the ideal (the
normative) over the real (the factual), then morality is necessarily relativized with
respect to the political attainment of human autonomy, bringing politics and morality
5inevitably into conflict, and opening the way to relativism.11 Further ore, because
human autonomy loses the sense of the absolute difference between is and ought,
means and ends, modern rationality inevitably tends to privilege instrumental or
technical reason at the expense of value rationality (to use Weberian terms), leading
in the short run to the loss of value on the part of the highest values (i.e., to nihilism)
or, in the historicist formulation favored by Strauss, to the historical situatedness of
all validity claims.
Strauss’s diagnosis issues a devastating and hardly avoidable challenge: if the
modern project of human self-assertion necessarily leads to “historicism,”
“nihilism,” and “relativism,” then this project must be abandoned, and the priority of
morality over politics reasserted by returning to the traditions of classical
rationalism (“Athens” and “Jersualem”). I propose to accept Strauss’s challenge and
defend the claim that the commitment to freedom in modernity requires the political
and historical situatedness of morality. For the “lowering” of moral standards that
Strauss condemns corresponds to the “elevation” of freedom in human affairs, first
evidenced by  Machiavelli’s understanding of self-assertion as political virtù.
Nihilism, relativism and historicism, under the redescription that I offer of them,
appear as features of an extra-moral ethics of responsibility in the face of the
“heightened” demands of human freedom, rather than as symptoms of a willful
immorality on the part of the moderns (as Strauss sees it). This commitment to
6freedom, this requirement of  the relativity of the moral, and finally this ethics of
responsibility in the face of both the commitment and the requirement compose what
I call the Machiavellian legacy to modernity.
There exists a competing legacy in modernity, generally identified with the
discourse of  Kant, that also assumes the central role of  freedom as self-assertion,
while holding that this freedom is in the last instance identical to moral autonomy,
not political virtù. The proponents of the Kantian legacy share many of  Strauss’s
criticisms against modernity but they do not want to adduce the responsibility for its
slippages into relativism or historicism or nihilism on the centrality of freedom as
such. Luc Ferry’s neo-Kantian critique of  modernity, for example, is in agreement
with Strauss on two counts, namely, that modernity runs the risk of falling into
historicism, and that Machiavelli and Hobbes are responsible for allowing this risk
to emerge in modernity.12  But Ferry rejects Strauss’s reduction of modernity to the
purportedly “naturalistic” bases first established by Machiavelli and Hobbes.
According to Ferry, modernity escapes historicism by grounding the absolute
character of  the distinction between fact and norm on a non-naturalistic,
transcendental concept of human freedom as moral autonomy (in accordance with
the doctrines of Rousseau, Kant and Fichte).13 If  Strauss ultimately thinks of
modernity as having exchanged history for nature as the standard of  values, making
all values both historical and subjective and thereby, in the end, depriving them of
7value, Ferry responds by pointing out that Strauss may be right with regard to
Machiavelli, Hobbes or Nietzsche (who are charged with considering only different
kinds of  “self-interested” freedom), but that his argument fails in the case of  Kant,
for whom there is a moral conception of freedom which escapes the charge of
nihilism and historicism. Modern political philosophy can make place for a
philosophy of history without thereby falling into historicism, since, in the thought of
Kant and Fichte, it is precisely the transcendence of  the ideal over the real, on the
basis of  a concept of noumenal freedom and not of a teleological idea of natural
order, that accounts for historical progress.14
Similarly, in his analysis of the origins of modern political philosophy,
Habermas reproposes the charge that Machiavelli is responsible for reducing politics
to a technique of power and for bringing instrumental reason into the sphere of
morality: “what is modern [in Machiavelli/MV] is the thesis that the technically
appropiate organization to meet the necessities of life, the correct institutional
reproduction of society, is prior to the good life, without these in themselves
representing the content and the goal of moral action.”15 But, unlike Strauss, Habermas
entertains the possibility that the introduction of instrumental rationality into politics,
intended to master the necessities of social life, might itself come under the control of
“moral action,” where morality does not refer to the ancient doctrine of virtue but rather
to the modern theory of autonomy. Habermas predicates the possibili y of
8recomposing the conflict between politics and morality in modernity on the capacity
of moral autonomy to avoid the twin rocks of ancient dogmatism and modern
relativism.
If modernity effects a massive break with the belief that human praxis ought
to be oriented towards the compliance with a heteronomous normative order, as
Strauss and Blumenberg and Habermas all agree, it remains to be seen what kind of
question modernity brings to bear on the instance of order from its new perspective
of  the autonomy of human praxis. On this point there seem to be only two possible
options: either modernity, like previous epochs, seeks in this autonomy a new
foundation of moral order, or modernity, unlike previous epochs, questions the
primacy of moral order in the name of freedom, and sees an irreconcilable tension
between the claims of freedom and those of morality.
Strauss and Habermas opt for the first reading of modernity. But Strauss takes
the position that once the difference between fact and norm, real and ideal, is not
founded on a pre-given and unchangeable (natural or divine) order, but exists only in
so far as man makes it himself, then there is no stopping the decline from moral
constructivism to moral relativism. Habermas, on the contrary, believes that freedom
as autonomy has an inherent relation to order such that it can realize itself only if it
gives itself the form of law, that is, if it checks itself by itself. This noumenal or
rational conception of freedom gives rise to a concept of history as the process
9whereby the real is progressively rationalized, that is, transcended and changed for
the sake of the ideal (e.g., some variation of the Kantian kingdom of ends) and the
ideal in turn acquires its validity through its progressive realization in the real. Norm
and fact, validity and facticity, enter into a dialectical relation that enables both
terms.16 In this way, freedom and justice, politics and morality, are seen to be in
principle compatible. For this strategy, then, freedom functions as the ground of a
new morality in modernity. If it makes impossible the kind of heteronomous
morality that Strauss identifies with the pure types of “Athens” and “Jersualem,”
nonetheless it purveys a morality and serves to legitimate social and political order:
the question of  “the best social order” is still answered “in a universally valid
manner,” except that the answer now calls for the “priority of  the right over the
good,” in Rawls’s famous formulation.
The Machiavellian legacy opts for the second reading of modernity. It sees in
the modern dissolution of ethical substance or moral order the effect of the
emergence of a radical conception of freedom as no-rule that resists the reduction of
political life to establishing legitimate forms of domination. This legacy develops a
discourse on freedom that emphasizes its facticity. Facticity denotes that aspect or
aspects of experience that function as the unconditioned condition of any theoretical
determination of experience. This understanding of “facticity” is usually opposed to
the idea of  “validity,” which assumes that only rational or theoretical
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determinations provide the unconditioned condition of experience. Therefore
“facticity” is to be strictly distinguished from “factuality” or the state of  being 
“fact.” Modern philosophy, at least since Kant’s Copernican revolution, advances
the belief  that theories are underdetermined by facts, and, furthermore, there are no
facts without some theory that makes them possible as facts. But if there are no facts
without theory, one cannot say the same about facticity: mortality and temporality
(both of which cannot be experienced as facts or objects of experience, and yet
without which one would have no such thing as experience) are examples of
factical, as opposed to factual, conditions of human life.17
In speaking about the facticity of freedom my intention is to bring out two of
its traits that are assumed without much analysis in both Strauss’s and Blumenberg’s
discussions of modern self-assertion. The first trait is the historical situatedness of
human freedom, whereby “man posits his existence in a historical situation and
indicates to himself how he is going to deal with the reality surrounding him,” to use
Blumenberg’s words. The second trait is the understanding of this freedom in terms
of  the priority of  praxis over theory, whereby changing the orders of the world
becomes more important than contemplating them. Freedom is factical both in the
sense that it is historically situated and that it can transcend its situation by changing
it. The two aspects of Machiavelli’s discourse that Strauss builds on for his theory
of modernity, namely, the “realism” of Machiavellian politics and its claim to
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“master chance,” correspond to the two traits of the facticity of freedom. My claim
is that the “historicism,” “nihilism,” and “relativism” evoked by Strauss’s analysis
of self-assertion acquire new meaning once they are understood as attributes of  the
factical conception of freedom. Here I briefly introduce this semantic change, in
order to develop it below.
The historical situation of factical freedom is linked to the new meaning of
historicism in the following way.  The difference between necessity and contingency
is situated rhizomatically in events, rather than grounded in forms; this means that
the difference between necessity and contingency (and consequently the difference
between ideal and real, validity and fact) is itself contingent or revocable.
Historicism is redefined by the space of  this revocability of modalities; and factical
freedom can subsequently be defined in terms of the power or virtù to change its
situation by revoking the contingent into the necessary and the necessary into the
contingent. This revocability of modalities defines an action as capable of changing
its situation, and therefore as free in the required sense. Analogously, Strauss’s
claim that Machiavelli’s discourse denies all natural teleology in favor of chance can
now be reinterpreted to mean that all determinations of necessity emerge
historically. This entails that the capacity to “master” chance, which Strauss
identifies as the clarion call of instrumental rationality, can also be reinterpreted to
mean that the historical situation in which necessity is determined can itself be
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changed through ethico-political sollicitation, thereby revoking the necessary back
into the contingent and in so doing “giving rise to the risk of an even greater
chance,”18 rather than to the technical extirpation of chance.
The capacity to factically transcend its situation exhibited by this conception
of freedom is linked to a redescription of nihilism as follows. Virtù or factical
freedom is the movement of  transcendence of reality: virtù is that through which an
objective or legitimate order of things can be virtualized, i.e., can have its
foundation or essence withdrawn and be reduced to mere appearance, semblance or
ideology. This transcendence of freedom is factical in the sense that it exceeds the
horizon represented by the unity between the real and the ideal, fact and norm. From
the perspective of factical freedom, this unity reveals itself as being functional to the
imposition on human praxis of necessary conditions of possibility that grant it its
objective form. As Habermas says, “the counterfactual presuppositions of actors
who orient their action to validity claims also aquire immediate relevance for the
construction and preservation of social orders; for these orders exist through the
recognition of normative validity claims.”19 The objective forms of human praxis are
simply products of the legitimation of the real, of the construction of moral order. If
there is to be an effective transcendence of objective reality, if a change of situation
is truly conceivable, then this transcendence cannot be oriented toward the ideal, it
cannot come as a function of the determination of a rule or norm, for the latter
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always underpins the construction of objectivity, but it will rather be oriented
toward “nothing,” toward the peculiar, non-dialectical negativity that I have
identified as no-rule. In this sense, then, one can speak of the “nihilistic” attribute of
factical freedom.
If the commensurability between politics and morality, freedom and justice, is
a requisite for the construction of legitimate order, then the contestation, resistance
and revocation of every such order depends on the possibility of articulating certain
moments of incommensurability between freedom and justice, morality and politics.
The “immoralism” that Strauss identifies in Machiavelli’s discourse can therefore be
reinterpreted in terms of such an incommensurability between factical freedom and
the discourse of morality. Likewise, the “realism” of  Machiavelli’s discourse can
now be reinterpreted to mean two things simultaneously: on the one hand, the
attention brought to the ways in which the transcendence of the ideal over the real,
of  the validity of the norm over the factual situation of its applicability, not only
does not imperil the establishment of political and social order but is necessary for
such a purpose. And, on the other hand, that only the factical character of the
transcendence of human freedom, i.e., the capacity of freedom to transcend an
objective state of affairs without being determined to do so by a norm or rule, can
guarantee the possibility of changing objective reality in events of no-rule.
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Machiavelli’s “realism” is therefore a realism about freedom in its insurmountable
tension with the project of establishing fixed orders.
In the alternative reading of modernity proposed by the Kantian legacy, the
factical concept of freedom is reductively understood as a particularistic shape of
modern self-assertion that can be either subsumed, neutralized or excluded by the
understanding of freedom as moral autonomy.20 I suggest that this move not only
betrays a lacks of historical sense, but is also philosophically problematic. Such a
reading of freedom in modernity forgets, as Strauss insightfully points out, that the
Kantian or constructivist understanding of freedom rises on a terrain, a situation,
that is prepared by the fact that “Machiavelli had completely severed the connection
between politics and natural law or natural right, i.e., with justice understood as
something independent of human arbitrariness. The Machiavellian revolution
acquired its full force only when that connection was restored: when justice, as
natural right, was reinterpreted in Machiavelli’s spirit. This was the work primarily
of Hobbes.”21 Needless to say, Kant and Hegel follow Hobbes in the attempt to
reconnect politics and natural right in the situation of modernity characterized by a
radical caesura between the discourse of freedom (politics) and that of justice
(morality). Strauss’s insight is interesting because of the suggestion that
Machiavelli’s discourse operates this caesura in advance of the elaborations of this
situation by the moral constructivisms of both a Hobbes and a Kant that “re-occupy”
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(to employ Blumenberg’s term) the positions left open by classical natural right, and
does so not only without providing the foundation for the emergence of  a new
doctrine of natural right, but, more importantly, by showing the questionableness of
just such a foundational project.
The attempt to sublate Machiavellian, factical freedom under Kantian,
noumenal freedom is also philosophically problematic because, were this operation
to succeed, it would unwittingly undermine the very conception of freedom it seeks
to uphold and universalize. In suspending the the claim to necessary and universal
validity congenital to the discourse of morality, the idea of factical freedom opens
itself to self-contestation and plurality, which is in turn pragmatically embodied by
the other, moral conception of modern freedom. The absence of legitimacy or
foundation for the factical conception of freedom is, in the end, the very trait that
does not disallow for the noumenal conception of freedom as foundation for
legitimacy, all the time limiting its univocal claims in the name of that self-
contesting and self-differing understanding of freedom that allows them to maintain
their conflictual cohabitation in the discourse of modernity. This is the sense in
which one can say that relativism is a feature of the Machiavellian legacy to modern
freedom.
16
The conflict between politics and morality in modernity
Machiavelli is the first to formulate the conflict between politics and morality
as an unsurpassable feature of the human condition.22
Many have imagined states such as nobody ever saw or knew in the real world, and there is
such a difference between the way we live and the way we ought to live that the man who
neglects the real to study the ideal will learn how to accomplish his ruin, not his salvation.
Any man who tries to be good all the time is bound to come to ruin among the great number
who are not good. Hence a prince who wants to keep his authority must learn how not to
be good.23
Political life no longer aims towards the moral ideal of a good life but is now turned
towards “the way we live,” that is, to factical life, where not everyone is good all
the time. Once political life loses its internal reference to the good life, the state (the
prince) reveals itself as a political actor that knows how not be good in its
employment of violence and co flict  to achieve its political rule. But this outcome
is neither the first, nor the most significant result of  Machiavelli’s re-evaluation of
the facticity of the human condition. For this outcome presupposes that one cannot
be good all of  the time, one cannot actually live “the good life” without thereby
ceasing to live life as it is given, in its facticity.24 For Machiavelli goodness is a
possibility that is situated in time: there is a time to be good, but one cannot be good
all the time. This claim raises the question: what political aspect or aspects of
factical life determine that one cannot be good all the time?
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The conflict between politics and morality runs hro gh modern political
thought like a red thread. No serious thinker has escaped it, though many have tried
to pacify it. So it is that Hobbes denies that there can be a difference between
despotism and monarchy, i.e., between factical and legitimate domination, in a
political system whose goal is the equal protection of every individual’s free pursuit
of their factical life. For Kant the institution of a state based on the political freedom
and equality of its members is a problem that “can be solved even by a nation of
devils.” Indeed, this problem can only be solved by devilish human beings because
the solution requires the conflict between self-interested individuals “in such a way
that their self-seeking energies are opposed to one another, each thereby neutralising
or eliminating the destructive effects of the rest.”25 Heg l constructs his system of
right by relying on the “cunning of reason” working in history. This cunning is
manifest in the verdicts of the tribunal of history which pursues the development of
freedom “by any means necessary,” and in so doing continuously humiliates the
individual’s moral conscience. Weber inaugurates contemporary political thought by
rejecting an ethics of ultimate ends in favor of an ethics of responsibility, which
corresponds to his belief that modern life is characterized by a polytheism of values,
none of which can be demonstratively shown to be more legitimate than the rest. As
a consequence, legitimacy must be grounded on a value-free (neutral) and
procedural idea of legality, which can be applied on condition that the state hold the
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monopoly of violence. In short, for Weber legitimacy and violence have an internal
relation. After Weber’s collapse of legitimacy onto legality, two general strategies
have recently emerged to respond to this situation. The first, associated with
Habermas, attempts to recover the Kantian legacy from within the scenario revived
by Weber. Habermas seeks to answer the question of  “how legitimacy is possible
on the basis of legality”26 by pursuing the possibility that the factical dimension of
politics has an essential relation to the moral validity of  the law.27 The second
strategy, associated with Foucault, pursues the Machiavellian legacy that sees legal
and moral order as a function of a conflict between practices of domination and
moments of resistance.28
In spite of  the massive differences between these positions, none of  them
formulate the moral point of view without taking into consideration, as a
fundamental given, that the extra-moral aspects of  political life have an essential
relation to the facticity of freedom. In modern political thought the moral point of
view, no matter how it is articulated, depends on the assumption that political
freedom has priority in the factical life of human beings. No modern discourse on
justice can afford to speak against the assumption that political freedom is a factical
condition  of life.
But the decisive consideration is that freedom does not stand in a symmetrical
situation with respect to morality: not only does political freedom not rest on
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morality, but it does not even assume itself as a normative principle. In the former
sense, political freedom is factical, not normative, because there is no one way in
which freedom “ought” to exist. In the latter sense, political freedom is factical
because it exists by contesting its meaning. Freedom is political to the extent that it
is free to interpret itself.
Modern political freedom situates or relativizes the claims of morality, and is
in this sense extra-moral. But political freedom is not extra-moral in any one
particular sense: there are only  extra-moral senses of freedom, as I illustrate below.
The point of drawing out these outcomes is to show the futility of passing a moral
judgment on these senses of freedom, and hence the need to maintain the conflict of
politics over morality. One cannot ask of  them “which is (morally) better” without
bringing into question the very equivocity of meaning that is essential to the self-
understanding of political freedom in modernity. Put otherwise, to lead a free
political life in modernity it is not sufficient  not to be good, it is not enough to dwell
with the conflict between politics and morality. One must also learn how not to be
good, which means to learn how to dwell with the further, inevitable conflict of
interpretations about that conflict. The latter task defines the purpose of  an ethics of
responsibility in the modern situation.
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The unity of politics and morality in the ancients
How the moderns ended up in this situation can be traced out by working
through the charges that Strauss advances against Machiavelli. The first of these is
Machiavelli’s “lowering” of standards for virtue entailed in his belief that political
virtue requires “learning not to be good.” Strauss takes this claim to mean that virtue
is no longer “understood as that for the sake of which the commonwealth exists, but
virtue exists exclusively for the sake of the commonwealth; political life proper is
not subject to morality... [because] it presupposes political society.”29 As a
consequence, the priority assigned to  political goals relativizes the scope of
morality: political life is neither instrumental nor consubstantial to the achievement
of the good life, the state is no longer the ethical substance it was for the ancients.
But it is Machiavelli’s second thesis that definitively cuts the moderns off
from the ancients and decides their trajectory:
fortuna (chance) is a woman: and it is necessary, if one wishes to keep her down, to beat
and hit her. And one sees that she lets herself be won more by the impetuous than by those
who proceed coldly; and always, like a woman, she is the friend of youth, because they are
less respectful, more ferocious, and have more audacity to command her.30
In his intentionally shocking formula, Machiavelli posits the conflictual, violent
relation that holds between chance and political action. Strauss contrasts this belief
with that of classical political philosophy for which “the establishment of  the best
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regime depends necessarily on uncontrollable, elusive fortuna or chance.”31 In other
words, whereas for the moderns political virtue is in conflict with chance, for the
ancients moral virtue stands in harmony with chance.
The best regime is said to depend on chance because the moral standard
against which any political regime must be measured is at once ideal and absolute:
there is an absolute separation (chorismos) between fact and norm, is and ought.32
As a consequence, there can be no rational or logical calculation (ogos) of means
and ends that can bridge the abyss between the validity of  the good (the sphere of
intelligible form) and the facticity of the real (the sphere of material circumstances,
of historical situations). This is why Plato says that the ideal can realize itself in the
real only by a providential “chance,” if at all; this is why Aristotle claims that the
moral virtues, as practical dispositions to choose the mean, presuppose the existence
of contingent situations over which these virtues have no control.33
The absolute separation between validity and facticity to which Strauss draws
attention is another way of asserting that the good is in no way situated or
dependent on the given, factical situation. This in turn means that irrespective of the
situation it is always possible, as a matter of principle, to “do the right thing,” since
“what is right” is independent of each and every situation. “What is right” is
determined “by nature,” not by historical convention. Because there is, in principle
and as a matter of principle, a right and a wrong way  for everything that happens
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the order of nature is said to be teleological. Human beings cannot willfully do as
they please, they cannot willfully disregard the natural rule, without incurring into
some wrong, as tragic wisdom (here at one with Platonic thinking) teaches. From
these assumptions, Strauss draws out two basic points of  ancient moral teaching.
The first is that “man’s power is limited [and] this limitation shows itself in
particular in the ineluctible power of chance.” The second is that “nature supplies
the standard, a standard wholly independent of man’s will” and “the good life is the
life according to nature, which means to stay within certain limits: virtue is
essentially moderation.”34 But if Strauss shows that for the ancients there obtains a
fundamental correspondence between virtue oriented toward the good and the
respect of chance, he tends to pass over a point of decisive political importance,
namely, that the belief in a natural teleology, the belief that the good commands in
nature, quickly translates into the double proposition that goodness consists in ruling
according to nature, and that the “best order” [ariste politeion] is the one in which
the “good” individuals [spoudaios] may rule. Together these propositions account
for the aristocratic bias of classical political thought.
The limit imposed to human freedom and power by ancient ethics is simply
the expression of  the fundamental belief that the natural division between ruler and
ruled is good as such and, conversely, that the good life is a matter of  ruling and
being ruled.35 When Aristotle states that “excellence [ar te] must be the care of the
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state” he points to this deep affinity between politics and morality, between the
practice of rule and the practice of virtue, contained in the idea of  the political state
as an ethical substance.36
This idea of ethical substance can also be deduced from the respect for
chance. Chance functions as a cipher of  the idea that the good is absolutely
transcendent with respect to the situation.37 This transcendence allows for every
action, as a matter of principle, to aim at the good in any given situation. Since the
good is ideal and can therefore be kept in view only theoretically (nous or technein
Plato, phronesis in Aristotle), and theory is fundamentally a question of
homologating the soul to the natural order, it follows that the action will be good to
the extent that it is “adequate to,” or “matches with,” or “corresponds to” the
situation, where the situation is always already determined as a case of a possible
law, as an instantiation of the natural order. “To do the right thing at the right time”
is the moral ideal of the ancients.38
Since virtuous action must correspond to the situation it cannot have as its
aim to change the situation. By default all normative action tends to fixate the
historical situation into an unchangeable order, i.e., into a natural substance.
Political action, in so far as it is in harmony with moral virtue, is done in view of
order and therefore political life condenses into the political substance of  the state.
Furthermore, if normative action exists in view of order, then it must not bring about
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conflict. For the ancients, virtuous action must seek concord; it is essentially
moderate. The evolution of the political situation into a political substance coincides
with the becoming-moderate or becoming-prudent of  political action. It is in this
sense that the political substance becomes an ethical substance.
The fundamental affinity between action and chance in ancient political
thought leads to the idea of the state as ethical substance. This idea expresses the
dialectical relation that holds between the practice of the good and the practice of
ruling. When the ethical good rules over action (by aiming for concord and
moderation) then the political rule is good, in the sense that the regime acquires
stability and expands its dominion, leaving it less vulnerable to unexpected change
of situations, just as if  its historical and contingent encounters were guided by
providence. Conversely, the political rule that seeks to stabilize itself will call forth
actions that acquire their ethical character by corresponding to their situation, rather
than changing it. This schema expresses the fundamental unity between politics and
morality in the ancients from Plato and Aristotle to Polybius and Cicero.
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The discordant origin of modern political freedom
 Returning to Machiavelli’s formula that “chance is a woman, and it is
necessary, if one wishes to keep her down, to beat her,” it is clear that by positing
an irreconcilable conflict between political action and its historical, contingent
circumstances, between virtue and chance, Machiavelli sets the basis for the
dissolution of ethical substance in modernity. The disrespect for “elusive chance” on
the part of  human virtù thus entails a wholesale rejection of the most  basic
assumption made by ancient political thought, namely, that rule is good and that the
good is a matter of rule. The conflict between politics and morality introduced by
Machiavelli’s discourse really amounts to the denial that the activity of rule can
have an apriori or metaphysical justification or legitimation. Because this discourse
rejects the idea that domination can ever be a good, it is in a position to expose the
violent, strategic establishment of systems of legal domination along with their
normative underpinnings. In short, as Spinoza and Rousseau knew, Machiavelli’s
discourse is scandalous only for those who wish to reduce political life to the
activity of dominating others in a legitimate way.
The logic of  Machiavelli’s argument can be reviewed as a function of the
reversal of the premisses that previously lead me to the idea of ethical substance.
The new idea of  a conflict between virtuous action and chance entails the rejection
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of the premise that the good transcends every situation. In Machiavelli’s discourse
the good is always situated. Eventually the good life becomes a matter of  individual
perspective and ceases to be as such a political question. Once the good is situated,
human action no longer has to correspond to its situation, and political action
becomes defined by the capacity of  human action to engage, and be a match for, its
circumstances. The freedom of  human action is not limited to the prudent goal of
corresponding to its situation but is defined in terms of its power (virtù) to change
its situation. Machiavelli establishes an internal relation between human freedom
and historical situation which can best be described by the formula: human freedom
is always in a situation to be able to change its situation. This is the effective
meaning of  Machiavelli’s formula “fortuna is a woman.”
The new situation in which morality finds itself is “political, not
metaphysical” (to cite Rawls): it responds to the political practices of freedom and
power, not to the normative metaphysics of rule of the ancients. But in the name of
what does Machiavelli relativize the good or the just? For the ancients the end of
morality is the constitution of an ethical substance, that is, the establishment of an
internal relation between the practice of rule and the practice of the good. Therefore,
by situating the good Machiavelli relativizes the practice of  rule in political life. The
practice of  rule can only be relativized with respect to an instance of  no-rule (an-
archy).
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Machiavelli’s critique of  the unity of morality and politics turns around the
new idea of  political freedom as no-rule, as suspension of the command-obey
relation, as absence of legitimate domination. As he says, “if one considers the end
of the nobles and of the people, one will see in the former a great desire to dominate
and in the latter only the desire not to be dominated, and thus a greater will to live
freely.”39 The “people” are not a unitary substance; this term stands for all those
who find their motive for action simply in the desire not to be dominated or
oppressed. Conversely, the “nobles” are simply those who find their motive for
action in the desire to dominate. From the new perspective introduced by the desire
for no-rule, Machiavelli can show that political life does not reduce itself to the
problem of  “who ought to rule.” Political life steps outside of  the mythical circle
between the practice of  rule and the practice of  the good within which ancient
thought had constrained it. Political life becomes dialogical by having to determine
“who ought to rule” in a situation that allows the desire for no-rule to be voiced by
those who are dominated in any given political order. As a consequence, after
Machiavelli the question of political freedom in modernity ceases being the classical
one of establishing and maintaining the best political form of rule, but instead
becomes that of  knowing how to change political forms in order to respond to the
ever renewed, and never satisfied, demands for freedom as absence of oppression.
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The concept of political freedom as no-rule can decenter the moral point of
view because it has no internal relation to the sphere of justice. One can illustrate
this point by taking Kant as an example, the one modern thinker everyone would put
forward as a counterexample to my claim. It has not been pointed out enough that in
Kant there is a primordial separation between freedom and justice:
Rightful (i.e. external) freedom cannot, as is usually thought, be defined as a warrant to do
whatever one wishes unless it means doing injustice to others [because]… the definition
would run as follows: freedom is the possibility of acting in ways which do no injustice to
others. Thus the definition is an empty tautology. In fact, my external and rightful freedom
should be defined as a warrant to obey no external laws except those to which I have been
able to give my own consent.40
Here freedom is not defined through an internal relation to justice, but rather through
its negation of rule: “a warrant to obey no external laws except those to which I
have been able to give my own consent.” External freedom is understood in relation
to non-obedience of any external authority, first, and only secondly as obedience to
one’s autonomy, i.e., obedience only to the law one has given to oneself. But to give
oneself the law of one’s action, as the Groundwork of a Metaphysics of Morals
shows, means to be free internally. Thus also the second part of the definition of
external freedom does not contradict the idea of no-rule, since external freedom
ends up signifying: non-obedience to any source of external rule, and obedience to
an internal source of freedom. In a second moment, external freedom is tied to
coercion: this connection gives the idea of  “right” as “rightful” freedom. Only here,
when freedom as no-rule is tied to coercion (and so to domination) does one have
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the return of the discourse of justice, something that is reflected by the fact that one
is speaking of  freedom as “right.”
The connection between freedom as no-rule and coercion which leads to the
idea of freedom as right requires the introduction of the concept of equality. But
there are at least two pertinent senses of  equality to be considered. The first springs
from the idea of freedom as no-rule: it is an expression of the factical situation that,
since freedom as no-rule cannot coerce anyone, so everyone is free to be “free,” i.e.,
to give oneself the law; and in this sense only is everyone “equal.” Therefore the
originary idea of equality also has nothing to do with justice, but merely follows
from the inner logic of freedom as no-rule. Freedom and equality together define the
possibility of  justice, not vice versa: to be just means to act in the respect of  the
freedom and equality of everyone. Since this respect entails the freedom of an other,
and so a check to my freedom, but since freedom cannot, as such, be checked, the
check will be in the form of coercion. The unity of justice and coercion on the
foundation of freedom as no-rule gives external or rightful freedom. Thus freedom,
both internally and externally considered, is always already “political” in Kant: in
the sense that it has to do with the priority of the rule/no-rule opposition.
Returning to the main argument in Machiavelli’s discourse, since political
freedom has no internal relation to justice, one can say that political action no longer
presupposes concord as its final cause. On the contrary, the category of discord
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becomes fundamental to political action. In particular, what is fundamental for the
political situation in which morality finds itself is the discord between those who
want to rule and those who want no-rule. For Machiavelli, no-rule is linked to the
entrance of  “the people that desires not to be commanded or oppressed” into
political life.41 Strictly speaking, it is questionable to say that modern politics has a
“democratic” bias, in the sense of  a bias towards the rule by the people. Rather,
one should say that the Machiavellian legacy imparts to modern politics a
“republican” bias, in the sense of  a bias directed to the empowerment of  the people
in order to resist and topple forms of  political and social oppression.
It is particularly important to recognize that modern freedom is, first and
foremost, conceived as no-rule, and therefore it is primarily opposed to domination
or rule. In Machiavelli’s discourse, and I believe for the rest of modern political
thought as well, the desire to rule and the desire for freedom as no-rule are the basic
givens of human factical life. Justice is not such a given. The discourse of justice is
secondary with respect to the above opposition, and it is related to the problem of
who is to rule. Justice has an internal relation to rule, not to no-rule: it is only from
within the logical space of  ruling and being ruled that it makes sense to ask whether
something, namely the type of  command or the type of obedience, is just. One
cannot ask whether the demand for freedom as absence of domination is just. Justice
is a matter of setting limits to rule from within the logical space of  rule itself.
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Freedom as no-rule has no need for the limits of justice because it does not
recognize the necessity of  rule to begin with: hence it cannot pose itself the problem
of limiting rule. Political freedom as no-rule does not dominate, and consequently it
does not need to be limited by considerations of justice.
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Liberal and republican outcomes of the conflict between morality and politics
Morality finds itself relativized or situated in a situation characterized by the
discord between rule and no-rule, domination and freedom. From this political
situation, two opposed and irreducible determinations of  modern political life
follow. The first can be described as the liberal interpretation of the modern political
situation. Whenever political freedom as no-rule is employed as the basis for
political rule, then the discourse of justice tends to totalize the discourse of freedom,
the claims of freedom are resolved  into claims of  justice, in short, the conflict
between politics and morality is pacified. The pacification of the conflict between
political freedom and morality always takes the form of an attempt to re-
transcendentalize, and de-situate, the moral point of view. This is done by arguing
that  the political situation is not a factical situation but, instead, a situation which
falls under certain apriori (necessary and universal) norms, a situation which is
“outside” of history and change and which is identical to a “state of nature,” in the
sense in which all modern natural right, from Hobbes to Rawls, understands this
term.
The liberal interpretation always orients political life towards the goal of
securing rule. The expression “to secure rule” has two equiprimordial senses.
According to the first, it is a question of securing the agency of domination from
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contestation by the desire for no-rule (i.e., securing the state from revolution,
rebellion, and so on). The second sense consists in making the practice of  rule
secure for those who are subjected to it by instituting constitutionally protected
individual and political rights. As I show in my interpretation, the logic of securing
the state from popular contestation by securing, in return, the people from the state
is already prefigured in Machiavelli’s discourse, even though this discourse does not
use the language of right. After Machiavelli, the principle of securing rule is given
the form of  right: this is the modern political instrument invented by Hobbes to
pacify the conflict between political freedom and morality.
Judged from the perspective of the originary political situation, one can say
that the form of right serves to repress the irreconcilable discord between rule and
no-rule. It has this power, first, because a right has an internal relation to coercion
and thus to domination and rule. As Kant says: “there is connected with Right by the
principle of contradiction an authorization to coerce someone who infringes upon
it.”42 Political freedom as right requires this internal relation to coercion because it
expresses a claim to justice, namely, the claim to the equal protection for all free
agents. In this context, equality is a moral category because it presupposes that the
problem is how to rule equally free agents. Once the question of ruling the equal
freedom of everyone is posed, then the moral discourse enters with its answer: the
ruling of equally free human beings can best be achieved if it is fair, hence through
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the equal protection of all the interested parties. Only at this point is the discursive
space for a theory of justice ready to be occupied.
A decisive difference must be drawn between the factical condition that
everyone is equally free, which is extra-moral, and the problem of how to rule the
equal freedom of all, which is a moral problem and calls for a moral concept of
equality. Equality is a political category when one is speaking about the “equality of
all  to make the law.” As indicated above, Kant shows an awareness of this point
when in the “First Definitive Article,” of Perpetual Peace he defines political
freedom as “a warrant to obey no external laws except those to which I have been
able to give my own consent,” that is, only those laws which I have given to
myself.43 Kant’s idea of freedom is linked to the idea of no-rule since it amounts to
non-obedience to any source of external rule, and obedience only to an internal
source of freedom (autonomy). Political equality springs from such an idea of
freedom as no-rule: since freedom as no-rule cannot coerce anyone, everyone is free
to be “free,” i.e., to give oneself the law, and in this sense alone everyone is equal.
This concept of  political equality necessarily falls outside the sphere of the state, of
its constitution, laws and orders since whoever is free to make or give the law
cannot in turn determine this freedom by subsuming it under a previously existing
law without denying it as such. Freedom as no-rule, indeed, entails a relation to such
a political equality since this freedom is capable of contrasting the practice of rule
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only if  it has access to the activity of  law-making in the absence of  the division
between who commands and who obeys, i.e., in the absence of domination. This
absence must be experienced by the political actors, and cannot be verified by the
external law, since this law is itself a cause of domination. In contrast,  when one
speaks about the “equality of all under the law” one is referring to moral equality:
the latter is a crucial principle for the limitation, and thus legitimation, of rule but not
for the formulation of freedom as no-rule.
The second sense in which rights pacify the conflict between politics and
morality is expressed by the fact that a right is a liberty which is always already
negative. Negative liberty is freedom that has an internal relation to an external
limit. For example, in the Leviathan Hobbes defines negative liberty in an internal
relation to externally imposed laws: negative liberty is found wherever the laws are
silent (silentio legis). Kant’s sense of  negative liberty is more vociferous in that he
defines it as the liberty to think freely but not to act freely, i.e. to disobey: “Argue as
much as you like and about whatever you like, but obey!”44 These senses of
negative liberty are very different from the sense of  freedom as no-rule which is a
positive or factical freedom to negate any and every source of domination, i.e.,
which has an internal relation to the transgression of external limits or constraints.45
Needless to say, these external limits can also be the laws of the state. Therefore,
the form of right is always already a negation of  the negativity of freedom as no-
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rule: it works simultaneously for the sake of  rule and for the sake of morality, i.e., it
provides the ground for legitimate domination in modernity. The system of  rights
always organizes political action for the sake of  the state: it carries forth the modern
attempt to construct ethical substance, to seek the pacification and unification of  the
discord between politics and morality. The difference between ancient and modern
ethical substances is that the modern pacification operates in a changed politico-
philosophical situation where freedom, and not justice, is privileged. The system of
rights is the only way in which it is possible to realize or give substance to freedom
as no-rule. But the project to realize freedom as no-rule always runs the risk of
dissolving this freedom: it gives this freedom the force to rule and thereby
depotentiates its capacity to contest rule. It gives freedom its substantial reality and
thereby cuts it off from its historicity, cuts it off from its situation as a situation to be
changed, denying its transgressive potential. This is the aporia implicit in liberalism.
Conversely, whenever the political situation reproposes the irreconcilable
conflict between politics and morality, freedom and justice, there obtains the second
determination of modern political life: action becomes political only if it is oriented
towards the goal of  living  free from rule. In these cases, the political situation
becomes that situation in which the actor seeks a change of situation. Every
pertinent instance of legitimate domination is suspended and contested in order to
get the state to respond to the new claims for freedom from rule. All new instances
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of order have to originate from an interruption of a prior order, that is, have to find
their beginning not from the domain of legal domination but from that of freedom as
no-rule, from the suspension of the command-obey relation. Following Arendt, who
defines the republic as a form of political life “where the rule of law, resting on the
power of the people, would put an end to the rule of man over man,”46  I call this
determination the republican interpretation of the modern political situation.
The crucial aspect of  the political situation once it enters its republican, as
opposed to liberal, determination consists in its radical finitude: the situated change
of situation is by definition a transgression that has the status of an event. In virtue
of its transgressive potential, the republican moment contrasts every liberal attempt
to put order in the political situation, to pacify the discord between rule and no-rule,
to give substance to freedom. One can therefore speak of  republican events in
which political orders undergo revolutionary changes. But, at the same time, the
moment of transgression is only an event: every attempt to give it a process-like or
substance-like duration, every attempt to naturalize this intrinsically historical
moment, denies the political situatedness of freedom itself  because it does away
with the discord between rule and no-rule for the sake of  no-rule. In this reading of
Machiavelli’s formula, at the core of what Strauss calls the historicist dimension of
modern political life, one finds the opposite of what Strauss charges: not the
reduction of political action to technique, not the “mastery of chance” that
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determines historical becoming as the vehicle for the rationalization of the real, but
the logical impossibility for instrumental rationality to predict, program or plan these
events of transgression which escape the reach of all technique in virtue of their
radical contingency and groundlessness. Likewise, no philosophy of history can be
built on the basis of these events of freedom because what is transgressed and
transcended in them is precisely the rational and moral construction of reality, the
very unity of ideal and real, that is aimed at by the project of realizing the moral
point of view in modernity, a project that is always (explicitly or implicitly)
articulated through a philosophy of history.
The attempt to absolutize political freedom as no-rule, the attempt to pursue
the chimera of a state of  no-rule, an order of  anarchy, can only lead to pure and
limitless violence (as opposed to the legitimate violence employed by the state as
system of rights). This is the phenomenon that Hegel called the Terror of  absolute
freedom. It constitutes the danger implicit in the modern republican determination of
political life. Modern political freedom must be self-contesting because it is
completely engaged by its political situation. This situation is a situation of
conflicting interpretations of freedom, in which political freedom is torn into its
liberal and republican moments, that alone can finitize political freedom in virtue of
their irreducible discord. Modern political life preserves its freedom only if it can
endure the oscillation between republican events of  freedom as no-rule and liberal
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processes of expanding the system of rights, each moment avoiding the temptation
to abolish its other.
In sum, the Machiavellian legacy to modernity consists in the
plurivocal interpretations that are given to the originary political situation of
the dissolution of ethical substance. In the liberal interpretation this
dissolution is both accepted and sublated into a new ethical substance that
takes the form of a system of rights. In the republican interpretation this
dissolution is pursued into what Strauss would call its historicist, nihilist, and
relativist consequences. But without this pursual the expansion of modern
political freedom in both its republican and liberal interpretations would be
impossible, because, as I indicated above in the case of Kant himself, the
Kantian legacy of a moral understanding of freedom requires as its condition
of possibility the Machiavellian legacy of a factical understanding of freedom,
and not vice versa. The very opposition of  these legacies, the fact that the
Machiavellian legacy is also the condition of the impossibility of the
realization of the Kantian idea of freedom, is precisely what allows both to
survive.47
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Historicism and the modern ethos of freedom
Habermas confirms that the krisis in the classical unity of morality and
politics does not have a unitary outcome but, in his words, gives rise to “the modern
ideas of self-realization and self-determination” that are to be considered “not only
different issues but two different kinds of discourse tailored to the logics of ethical
and moral questions.”48 One can assume, relatively unproblematically, that the
Kantian legacy, from Hegel to Habermas, works out the logic of freedom as “self-
determination” or moral autonomy. It would not be stretching matters too far to
claim that the logic of freedom corresponding to “self-realization” or political virtù,
initiated by Machiavelli’s discourse, finds its continuation in the late modern
discourses of  Nietzsche, Weber and Foucault. These discourses are identified, by
Strauss as much as by Habermas, with the completion of  modern self-assertion in
the discursive traits of historicism, nihilism and relativism. It is now possible to
indicate how these traits emerge as a function of an ethics of responsibility that
responds to the modern situatedness of morality brought about by the centrality of
factical freedom.
Foucault’s interpretation of the Kantian Enlightenment serves this purpose for
three reasons.49 First, this nontraditional reading frames Kant’s discourse in a
continuity of sorts with those of Machiavelli and Nietzsche. In so doing, it coincides
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with Strauss’s description of the “three waves”of modernity. For that reason
Foucault is able to offer a direct response to the Straussian claim that modernity is
thoroughly historicist and leads to moral relativism by redescribing historicism as
the essential feature of  the modern ethos of  freedom. This move radicalizes the
internal relation between freedom and history that constitutes the fundamental
innovation of  Machiavelli’s discourse according to the interpretation I have given of
it.
Second, Foucault’s reading of the Enlightenment revives the conflict between
the two logics of modern political freedom that is tendentially compromised, if not
extinguished, by the strategy of  universalism espoused by the Kantian legacy. Since
the concept of freedom as moral autonomy presupposes the commensurability of
freedom and law, its discursive articulation cannot but advance the claims of
universalism that are inherent in every justification of the law that appeals to its
formal characteristics. As a consequence, the Kantian legacy not only finds it
extremely difficult to articulate a critique of its own universalism, but it also exhibits
a strong tendency to reduce the logic of  “self-realization” as political virtù to the
claims of particularism, with the result that the standpoint of an ethics of
responsibility is radically depoliticized.50
Such a reduction of the Machiavellian legacy to a form of  political
particularism is unwarranted. The discourse of  self-determination or moral freedom,
42
in virtue of  the internal link between noumenal freedom and the form of the law,
conceives of  the self as free only on condition that its praxis is (or tends towards
the)  necessary and universal. It operates under the basic assumption that only in this
situation of  necessity and universality is it apriori possible for praxis not to
encounter any resistance and as a consequence to be truly free praxis. Conversely,
Foucault’s presentation of  the practice of  self-realization or political virtù reiterates
the internal link between factical freedom and the transgression of  the law. As a
consequence, it conceives of  the self as free in so far as it divests itself of those
identity-formations (both universal and particular ones) that give a necessary form to
its praxis, in order to win for this praxis a space of  freedom from necessity. If  it is
certainly the case that this latter conception of freedom cannot be “necessary and
universal,” it would be a philosophical error to assert that it must therefore be
“contingent and particular.” Freedom as political virtù lies outside of  the dualism
universal/particular, as much as that of  necessary/contingent, because its facticity
refers to the event-character of the difference between contingency and necessity
(i.e., to the finite transcendence of this difference such that one can be convertible
into the other), and this feature allows the discourse of factical freedom to maintain
the historicity of every determination of universality (and thereby of particularity,
which is logically dependent on the former).
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Third, by focusing on the link between the question of the Enlightenment and
that of revolution in the Kantian corpus, Foucault’s reading recovers at the center of
Kant’s noumenal conception of freedom the anterior trace of the Machiavellian,
factical conception of freedom. In this way, Foucault indicates how the discourse on
modernity carried forward by the project of  Enlightenment, which turns on the
possibility of the moral progress of humanity, cannot be separated from the idea of
modernity as a situation in which revolutionary changes of situation become
possible. From the point of view developed in this book, Foucault’s discourse
recapitulates, in an extremely concentrated form, the central motifs exhibited so far
in the presentation of  the origin and outcomes of  the conflict between politics and
morality in modernity.
If for Strauss historicism means that philosophy or theory no longer has
access to supra-historical or ahistorical validity-grounds, then Foucault’s idea of the
Enlightenment is thoroughly historicist. According to him, Kant’s question of
Enlightenment serves to recast philosophy, in the situation of modernity, as a
practice that is relative to its historical situation: “philosophy as problematization of
an actuality, and as questioning of this actuality on the part of the philosopher who
belongs to this actuality and in relation to which he must be situated, all this could
characterize philosophy as a discourse of modernity and on modernity.”51 An
essential trait of the situation of modernity is the impossibility of gaining a
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philosophical or theoretical understanding of this situation that, simultaneously, lies
outside of it. The philosophical understanding of the situation of modernity must
itself be situated in modernity, and that is why there cannot be one such
understanding.52 Nothing less follows from the priority of event over form in
modernity and the two ineluctible yet conflictual understandings of  modern political
freedom that articulate this priority.
 The historicism that Foucault individuates in the project of the Enlightenment
is not as such a theoretical position designed to refute the primacy of theory over
practice characteristic of classical political philosophy. If it were, it could not
survive the objection of pragmatic contradiction levelled to all merely theoretical
articulations of relativistic claims. On the contrary, for Foucault the question of
Enlightenment is a practical matter of reflecting “on ‘today’ as difference in history
and as motive for a particular philosophical task,”53 i.e., it is a question of
illuminating the present as a situation in which a change of situation can be
practically effected. In so far as historicism is an essential moment of  this
illumination, then it is an essential element of  the ethos or practice of modern
factical freedom. To be modern, to exhibit what Foucault calls the “attitude of
modernity,”54 in this sense, means to experience as praxis the radical historicity of
one’s situation. To put it in the language of Machiavelli, to be modern means to
encounter one’s situation with virtù, that is, in view of effecting its change.
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This historicism of modernity also avoids the charge of self-refutation in a
different way, which is connected to the “realism” that Strauss imputes to it. Unlike
the naïve idea of historicism held by Strauss, the historicism illustrated by Foucault
does not consist in subjecting the purportedly atemporal determinations of validity
to the empty continuum of linear time, for if this were the case, then the claims of
historicism as well would have to be subject to the linear passage of time, and in
that way itself pass away.55 What makes historicism into an ethos, rather than a
theory, is precisely that it does not accept the linear passage of  time as an
unsurpassable fact. Rather than succumbing to the “vertigo in the face of the passing
moment,”56 it assumes a “certain attitude with respect to this movement... [which]
consists in recapturing something eternal that is not beyond the present instant, nor
behind it, but within it.”57 Historicism as ethos, in other words, finds through time a
way out of time, or, better, finds a way to suspend and reverse the empty and linear
passage of time, acceding to what Foucault here refers to “eternity.”
Historicism as ethos accomplishes this break with linear temporality because
it “is the will to heroize the present.”58 The realism that Strauss imputes to modern
historicism acquires a new sense in Foucault’s definition of  modern heroism as “an
exercise in which extreme attention to what is real is confronted with the practice
of a liberty that simultaneously respects this reality and violates it.”59 In th
situation of modernity, what passes for objective reality is something whose
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“eternal” aspect is “indissociable from a desperate eagerness to imagine it, to
imagine it otherwise than it is, and to transform it not by destroying it but by
grasping it in what it is.”60 The paradox of this formulation is only apparent:
historicism seeks to determine the reality of the situation, but precisely the more the
situation reveals itself as such, in its reality, “in what it is,” the more it becomes
something that can be imagined otherwise, transformed, virtualized because it
belongs to the essence of a situation that it can be changed. And the change,
transgression or transcendence of the situation, in that it requires the revolutionizing
of  the times, the suspension of their linear progress, the destruction of  their
tradition, is what accounts for the dimension of  “eternity” that exists “within” the
“present instant” of the situation in question.
Historicism as ethos, as “the practice of a liberty that simultaneously respects
reality and violates it,” exhibits a pathos against necessity that accounts for its
conflict with the moral conception of freedom in the Kantian legacy.
If the Kantian question was that of knowing what limits knowledge has to renounce
transgressing, it seems to me that the critical question today has to be turned back into a
positive one: in what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is
occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints? The
point, in brief, is to transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation into
a practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression.61
By advocating the relative priority of  politics over philosophy, praxis over theory,
Foucault retrieves the Machiavellian rupture with the ancients in order to contest the
“theoretical” bias, the “antiquity” that is still present in the Kantian articulation of
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modern critique. The priority of politics over philosophy is advanced as a function
of an ethics of transgression whose criterion for free action is the transformation of
the necessary into the contingent, and vice versa. If  for philosophy “necessity” is
the terminus ad quo, then for modern politics it is the terminus ad quem, namely, it
is that limit which can be transcended or transgressed.
Foucault’s reversal of the course taken by critique in the Kantian legacy is
simply the adoption and radicalization of the priority of the event over the form that
characterizes Machiavelli’s discourse:
Criticism is no longer going to be practiced in the search for formal structures with
universal value, but rather as a historical investigation into he events that have led us to
constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking,
saying. In that sense, this criticism is not transcendental... it is genealogical in its design and
archeological in its method.62
Moving away from the priority assigned to form, critique passes from the
identification of necessary limits as transcendental structures (i.e., of necessary and
universal conditions of possibility of objects of experience), to the retrieval of  the
contingent origins of what is taken to be necessary in any given time.
A critique that assumes the priority of event over form is a genealogical, as
opposed to transcendental, critique:
[the genealogical critique/MV] will not deduce from the form of what we are what it is
impossible for us to do and to know; but it will separate out, from the contingency that has
made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, thinking what we are, do, or
think. It is not seeking to make possible a metaphysics that has finally become a science; it is
seeking to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of
freedom.63
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The genealogical articulation of critique understands the difference between the
necessary and the contingent to be rooted in events, thus as itself contingent and
changeable. To show how the necessary can become contingent and the contingent
can become necessary are the respective tasks of genealogy and archeology.64 In
line with the basic assumption that the Machiavellian legacy does not exclude the
Kantian one but both enables and limits it, Foucault thinks of archeology as a
practice that substitutes for, rather than eliminates, the search after transcendentals
in the Kantian legacy: archeology uncovers the different “historical aprioris” of
discourse, with an emphasis on the process whereby a contingent event, a given
expression, attains its apriori status.65  Genealogy, conversely, is that aspect of
critique that negates the apriori as such by bringing back the form to the point of its
event-like emergence, and opens the possibility of transgressing its limit.
The ethos of freedom, then, consists in “a historico-practical test of the limits
that we may go beyond, and thus as work carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as
free beings.”66 But what kind of “work” qualifies the self  as a modern “hero,”
capable of carrying out “this ironic heroization of the present, this transfiguring play
with reality”?67 The work performed by the self on itself moves in the opposite
direction of  autonomous self-determination that is achieved by giving itself
universal and necessary laws. Instead of identifying freedom with reason’s
49
counterfactual capacity to transcend every situation as such, the “hero” of modernity
is “the man who tries to invent himself,” who faces “the task of producing
himself,”68 in order to exercise the capacity to remove “conditions of necessity,”
i.e., to garner the power to change the situation in which any given norm or law
appears endowed with necessity and universality. This “heroism” is ironical because
it orients the self toward the de-realization of  “what is not or is no longer
indispensable for the constitution of ourselves as autonomous subjects.”69 Indeed,
modern self-assertion, as Foucault conceives of it, is best expressed as the practice
of self-virtualization rather than self-realization because it entails an experience of
the alterity of the constructs of self-identity. To be factically free means to be
capable of  being otherwise.
According to the Kantian legacy, the moral presupposition of  the horizon of a
common humanity (Kant’s idea of Menschheit) allows the self to recognize the
other as another self. The other, in this model, is the nothingness of the self which it
needs to overcome in order to attain the identity of humanity, the mutual recognition
of self and other that Fichte expresses in the formula “I=I”and that Hegel defines as
“spirit” [Geist]. For the Kantian legacy, then, one may  speak of the “nothingness,”
of the lack of essence, of humanity as a function of seeing the other as another
self.70
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Foucault contests the appeal to the value of  “humanity,” or universal self-
identity, as something already given, if only as a regulative ideal for all the
transformations of the self, i.e., for all permutations of becoming-otherwise, on the
grounds that it goes against
the principle of a critique and a permanent creation of ourselves in our autonomy: that is, a
principle that is at the heart of the historical consciousness that the Enlightenment has of
itself. From this standpoint, I am inclined to see Enlightenment and humanism in a state of
tension rather than identity.71
Critique stands in tension with humanism to the extent that it valorizes the capacity
of the self to become other to itself, to transcend and transgress its constructs of
self, as a function of its openness to an other who challenges the predetermined
horizon of what counts as humanity, no matter how wide or abstract this horizon is
factually drawn. If the humanist ideal always seeks the egoicity of the other, the
Machiavellian legacy carried forward by Foucault stands for the experience of the
alterity of the self in virtue of which each (human) being has access to its
singularity, to the aspect of humanity that comprehends each (human) being in so far
as it is an exception to the universal, in so far as it stands outside of the law. To
become singular in this way means to open the self to the irreducible plurality of
(human) beings and their factical freedom, a plurality that pragmatically calls into
question the existence of  Man.
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The necessary complementarity, achieved only through conflictuality, of the
Machiavellian and Kantian legacies re-emerges on this issue of nihilism. For the
latter, the value of  humanity underpins all of the fundamental rights. For the former,
this value (as the highest value) must be put into question as part and parcel of the
republican interpretation of the modern political situation that carries with it a
critique of the system of rights in the name of freedom as isonomy or no-rule.
Modern isonomy not only entails equality under the rule of law but also equal
capacity to make and unmake the law in conditions of no-rule.72 The latter equality
cannot itself fall under the form of law, therefore it factically opens the system of
rights beyond  those who are already “equal under the law” (even the moral law) to
those who are systematically unequalized or excluded by virtue of the law (even the
moral law).
It is possible to give a sketchy topography of who remains “outside” of the
system of rights, of the “outsiders” that the republican understanding of isonomic
freedom seeks to address. They are the ones who remain caught in the exclusionary
circle that characterizes the liberal understanding of the tension between natural or
human rights and political rights, the vicious circle whereby to have one’s human or
natural rights recognized it is already necessary to be a citizen and have political
rights, while the constitution and attribution of these political rights ought to
presuppose the prior recognition of natural or human rights.73 Here I must limit
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myself to indicate that the exclusionary dynamic of the modern system of rights is
explained by the fact that the form of political intersubjectivity to which the self
must belong in order to be recognized as “human,” and therefore as endowed with
natural or human rights, is always already culturally predetermined, whether in a
particularistic or universalistic sense.74 In other words, the presupposition of natural
or human rights is understood as cultural fact: in its particularistic variant, the
cultural fact usually refers to purportedly irrevocable attachments to given political
or religious forms; in its universalistic variant, the cultural fact refers to purportedly
irrevocable attachments to context-independent rational or argumentative forms. In
neither case is the cultural fact inherently open to interpretation and contestation.
It is on the seemingly irrevocable character of such cultural facts that factical
freedom as the practice of self-virtualization sets itself to work in order to
performatively dissolve the cultural fact into what might be called a cultural right,
understood as a free space for political self-invention in the sense given to this term
by Foucault’s concept of an ethos of freedom. One can say that the nihilistic pursuit
of factical freedom described by Foucault, a pursuit that orients itself not to the
humanity which it has already become but to the humanity which it has not yet
transgressed itself into, coincides with the pursual of what Arendt calls the “right to
have rights.”75
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If what I call a cultural right and Arendt calls a “right to have rights” denotes
the right to “a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions
effective,”76 then under the liberal interpretation of the modern political situation this
right is not recognized as such, as a space of  freedom, but is rather assumed as a
fact that conditions the entrance into the modern system of rights, and narrows the
possibilities of modern freedom. Conversely, the “place in the world” where what
one says passes from being insignificant, either because unheard or already said, to
being significant, and what one does passes from being ineffective, either because
ignored or already done, to being effective does not designate a physical or
geographical place at all, but rather marks out the limits and function of the modern
political situation under its republican interpretation. The exercise of the “right to
have rights” coincides with the exercise of factical freedom as self-virtualization; its
“place” corresponds to the republican event of freedom; its ethics are those of
responsibility. For the appeal to a discourse of responsibility is needed only once
freedom and law (whether heteronomously or autonomously given) are no longer
commensurable, that is, only in those events of  political changes of laws and orders
that originate in the expression of freedom as no-rule. Only when freedom cannot be
ruled by law, or when freedom exceeds the rule of law (in both of its facets: that of
legality as much as that of legitimacy) is there space for an ethics of responsibility
that stands outside of the discourse of morality. For it is clear that where the law
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rules over human praxis it is impossible to accede to a position of intrinsic
responsibility for this praxis: this position is only available in the case of a
transgression of the law that is not in turn commanded by a higher law.77
The formulation of the question of Enlightenment in terms of the right to have
rights is inseparable from the republican interpretation of the modern political
situation as a revolutionary event, as a situation in which radical changes of situation
can happen. One may therefore read Foucault’s linkage of the question of
Enlightenment to the question of revolution in the Kantian corpus as an effort to
think together the republican and the liberal interpretations of the modern political
situation, to articulate the right to have rights as revolutionary event, on the one side,
and the system of rights as ground of political form, on the other.78
In The Conflict of the Faculties, Kant addresses the phenomenon of modern
revolution in the process of settling the conflict between the Enlightenment project
of philosophy (the faculty of philosophy) and the discourse of legitimacy (the faculty
of law). The solution Kant offers passes turns on his “renewed attempt to answer
the question: ‘is the human race continually progressing?’.”79 Foucault reads Kant’s
solution as follows:
if one wants to answer the question “is there a perpetual progress of humankind?” one must
determine whether there exists a possible cause of such progress, but once one has
established this possibility, one has to show that this cause effectively acts, and for that one
needs to identify a certain event that shows that the cause acts in reality. In short, the
assignment of a cause will never be able to determine anything except possible effects, or
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more exactly the possibility of an effect, but the reality of an effect can only be established
by the existence of an event.80
Kant famously identifies such an event in the French Revolution. Granted that the
very idea of Enlightenment stands or falls on the possibility of  the “perpetual
progress of humankind,” the question of revolution cannot be separated from this
progress itself, nor from the regulative ideal of morality that rules over this progress,
because both depend on the existence of an event of freedom that is both
revolutionary and factical in character. Therefore at the heart of  Kant’s noumenal
conception of freedom Foucault locates the anterior trace of a factical conception of
freedom, i.e., of a conception of freedom that is internally linked to its event
understood as the revolutionary change of situation.81
In this sense, Foucault is interested in showing how the liberal system of
rights that Kant derives from the application of noumenal freedom82 reveals itself as
conditioned by republican events of freedom that both permit and limit the
possibility of raising questions of  normative validity in a strictly universal sense.83
The argument that subtends Foucault’s interpretation of Kant is as follows: the
transcendence of the norm over the situation, such that it is capable of  applying to
that situation and thus showing itself to be valid, is not something given by the form
of the law itself. Rather, what gives a norm the possibility of  being valid, i.e., of
applying to a given situation in virtue of its transcendence of the situation, is the
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prior condition that this situation be, always already, capable of being changed.
Since the change of situation, by definition, cannot be overseen by the norm as such,
this change can be nothing other than the effect or event of factical freedom that I
am calling here a “revolution” and that corresponds to the republican event of
freedom.
When the revolution is understood as an event of  factical freedom it
functions both as the condition of possibility and impossibility of the Enlightenment
concept of history as progressive realization or constitution of moral freedom. As
Foucault argues,
The revolution, in any case, will always risk falling to the wayside, but as an event whose
content itself is unimportant, its existence attests to a permanent virtuality that cannot be
forgotten: for future history, it is itself the guarantee for the continuity of the movement
towards progress [d’une démarche vers le progrès].84
The event of freedom expressed in the revolution does not derive its peculiar
significance from its specific political content, but from the facticity of its
happening: there is a “future” for history, and therefore for “perpetual progress,”
only on condition that events of freedom happen again, i.e., only on condition that
the empty continuum of time is repeatedly broken down, interrupted, reversed,
revolutionized. Revolution is “a permanent virtuality that cannot be forgotten”: it
does not mark the realization of an idea of freedom, as much as the virtù-alization of
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the “objective reality” of  law and order along with the “ideal” validity that
maintains them in existence.
Foucault’s characterization of the revolutionary event is only understandable
against the background offered by the theory of political action found in
Machiavelli’s discourse. An action is factically free in virtue of its capacity to
change the times: this change is defined by the polemical encounter (risco tro)
between action and the times. Because the collision of action and time fragments
(literally: concusses) the result of the action, one can say that what is done is always
already incomplete and unfulfilled. This trait of political action accounts for the
belief that events are never “complete” or “whole” as such, and, as a consequence,
their judgment cannot be a matter for ex post facto reflection. Historical judgment,
the judgment on history, is therefore a practical matter, a question of the ethos of
freedom. Furthermore, it is the same conflictual character of the encounter between
action and times that results in the un-hinging of the times, in their being set “out of
joint,” thereby calling into question both the linearity and irreversibility of the
passage of time, which is the presupposition behind every conception of  the
“irrevocable” character of action (“what is done cannot be undone”). These two
traits of free praxis characteristic of the Machiavellian legacy serve to account for
the sense in which the revolution is, in Foucault’s striking formulation, a “virtuality
that cannot be forgotten.”
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Indeed, understood as the expression of factical freedom, the significance of
revolution according to the Machiavellian legacy does not consist in the political
forms and orders that it might construct but, on the contrary, in its power to testify
that what is done is also, always already, undone: the revolution is a “virtuality” in
the sense that its force consists in virtualizing reality. Similarly, a revolution “cannot
be forgotten” in the sense that in the actuality of the present as revolutionary
situation, the “past,” what was done, is never past. The “past” is never really past
because what is done is always radically incomplete, unfinished, concussed, and for
that reason it withholds the possibility of its own un-doing, the possibility of
withdrawing the irrevocability of what exists. Just like the past is never a completed
state of affairs, so too the state (or political form) can never hope to totalize itself in
history: in the republican events of freedom that suspend the validity of political
forms and reduce them to their an-archic origins, the past finds its future, the one
that can “accomplish” or “judge” it, and in so doing bring the linear passage of time
to a halt in what Machiavelli calls the (eternal) return of beginnings and Benjamin
refers to as the apokatastasis (restitution) of history.85
If the action that changes the times is always an un-doing of what was done,
then one cannot be “done with it”: revolutions either (eternally) return or they do not
exist. For this reason Foucault remarks that their existence is that of a memory
(“they cannot be forgotten”), since memory is essentially what returns, it is
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repetition as praxis. Just as Machiavelli believes that only morally-contradictory
actions of  “extraordinary virtù,” i.e., actions that “return to beginnings” and effect
republican events, testify to the fact that “in republics there is a greater life, a
greater hatred, more desire for revenge that neither lets, nor can let the memory of
ancient freedom rest,”86 so for Foucault the revolution is precisely that event whose
“memory” exists as a genealogical counter-memory, that is, whose event gives rise
to that peculiar memory that carries the contra-diction of the an-archic trait of the
situation of modernity “against the grain” of history and its “perpetual progress,”
that resists and counters the “official memory” of the victors, established in the
institutions that last, in the works of “civilization” that only the vision of Benjamin’s
angel of  history can show to be a series of ruins, the fragments of history’s res
gestae.87
The Machiavellian legacy to modern politics has always been accused of
harboring a demonic vision of politics as the activity of founding political forms of
domination. One should not forget that, to the extent that it does so, it is never
without the corresponding angelic vision of history that leaves open the “narrow
door” of the republican event of freedom. That the Machiavellian legacy of political
freedom consciously deprives itself of the Kantian formulation of the categorical
imperative does not mean that it has none. “Act in such a way that the angels have
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something to do,”88 is perhaps the one imperative that an ethics of responsibility as
ethics of freedom can stand for.
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